We estimate a small structural model for inflation, the output gap, the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate for Hungary during the period of the transition (1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999). The transmission of monetary policy impulses to macro variables is characterized in a similar fashion to that of advanced open industrial countries. In particular, in the context of our rational expectations, forward-looking model, the interest rate channel on aggregate demand and the exchange-rate channel work together as parts of the same disinflation policy. We draw several conclusions on understanding and modeling the effects of monetary policy, and also on the desirable design of policy rules during the process of disinflation. Despite this overall favorable picture, many analysts point out to several shortcomings in the process of institutional reform and in the design and coordination of economic policies, especially prior to 1995. The process of privatization and of bank reform lacked transparency and momentum, and macroeconomic stability was threatened by a lack of fiscal discipline, as the government deficit reached between 6% and 7% of GDP in the period 1992-1995. Also, although the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has been granted since 1991 ample institutional independence, monetary policy has not always achieved full credibility.
Introduction *
Compared to other Central European countries, the path of Hungary towards stable macroeconomic growth and low inflation after 1990 seems relatively smooth. In fact, the impact of the end of the socialist regime was probably less intense than elsewhere: the maximum cumulative fall in real GDP, between 1989 and 1993, was a modest (by transition standards) 18%. On the other hand, CPI inflation reached only 35% in 1991 and then again 28% in 1995. And after 1995 growth and disinflation have proceeded hand in hand, with an average GDP growth of 4.7% in 1997-99, while inflation came down to 10% in 1999.
Despite this overall favorable picture, many analysts point out to several shortcomings in the process of institutional reform and in the design and coordination of economic policies, especially prior to 1995. The process of privatization and of bank reform lacked transparency and momentum, and macroeconomic stability was threatened by a lack of fiscal discipline, as the government deficit reached between 6% and 7% of GDP in the period 1992-1995. Also, although the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has been granted since 1991 ample institutional independence, monetary policy has not always achieved full credibility.
However, in 1995 the government adopted a stabilization package, which gave new momentum to the process of institutional reform, reinstated fiscal discipline, introduced drastic measures of wage restraint and an import surcharge, devalued the forint and -in agreement with the NBH -introduced a pre-announced crawling peg regime for the exchangerate.
In this paper we focus on the analysis of the process of disinflation, and in particular on the design of monetary policy and on the role of interest and exchange rates in the transmission * We thank Pierre Siklos and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions.
mechanism, from 1991 to 1999. Often, researchers working on the experience of disinflation in transition economies suggest that conventional macroeconomic methods and models should not be applied to these countries. Of course, they are right to observe that the institutions and the economic structure have been undergoing rapid changes in the course of the 1990s, and that -at the beginning of transition -the evolution of output and prices had been subject to shocks which cannot be accounted for in equilibrium models. However, since inflation finally stabilized, and output growth resumed, it must also be true that ultimately the initial shocks have been absorbed and monetary policy has gained a degree of effectiveness not far from that of the more advanced industrial economies. Moreover, although it is possible that the microeconomic channels of monetary policy transmission were subject to some changes, at least in Hungary the basic structure of money markets was already in place at the beginning of the 1990s, and interest rates had been liberalized towards the beginning of the decade. Hence, the extent to which the macroeconomic features of the transmission mechanism have remained stable throughout this period is largely an empirical question, and we decided to approach it in analogy to a proof of the pudding. We set up a simple model of the interaction between aggregate demand, aggregate supply, the exchange rate and a short-term domestic interest rate, with rational expectations. We estimate the model for the period 1991-99, and simulate the outcome of alternative policy rules within and outside the estimation sample.
Estimation results conform to our expectations, the model tracks the data quite well and it is not sensitive to changes in the estimation sample, and especially to the inclusion of pre-1995 years. In the simulations, the response of macro variables to changes in the policy rules is quite reasonable.
Our findings imply that policy transmission proceeds through the following steps: (i) an increase in the domestic interest rate induces a contemporaneous appreciation in the exchange-rate (which has been the intermediate policy target 1 throughout the period); (ii) in the next round of effects, with a well-identified lag structure, both the interest rate and the exchange-rate dampen aggregate demand and inflation. In particular, interest rates do not enter directly in the inflation equation; they affect inflation only indirectly through the exchange rate and aggregate demand equations. As it is a standard practice in monetary analysis 2 we do not model the evolution of trend output. Instead, we concentrate on the output gap, measured by the degree of capacity utilization. This allows us to avoid altogether the issue of modeling output supply shocks.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 briefly describes the goals and instruments of monetary policy. In section 3 we discuss the specification, estimation and simulation of a macro model of the transmission mechanism. Results and some implications for the design of monetary policy are presented in section 4. Section 5 briefly concludes.
Monetary policy goals and implementation
In this section we examine the setting of monetary policy in Hungary during the last decade (see Figure A -1 for some graphs). This period can be divided in two phases, differing with respect of the exchange-rate policy. The first phase, from January 1991 to March 1995, was an adjustable peg; the second phase was a pre-announced crawling peg with daily devaluations. 2 See for instance Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) . We begin by examining the first phase. During this period, the macroeconomic situation of Hungary was quite critical, and most indicators deteriorated rapidly. Each year between 1991 and 1995 GDP decreased, at annual rates ranging from -1% to -5%. CPI inflation was 35% in 1991 and was up again to 28% in 1995. The government budget moved from a balanced position in 1990 to a deficit of about 6-7% of GDP for the years 1992-95. Also the current account evolved from a modest surplus in 1990-92 to a deficit of about 10-11% of GDP in 1993-94. During this phase, the exchange rate was the fulcrum of two conflicting central bank objectives: to promote external competitiveness and to provide a nominal anchor for price stability 4
. This conflict was hardened by the lack of cooperation from fiscal and incomes policies. Thus, and although the independence of the NBH had been guaranteed since 1991 5 , during this period inflation stabilization did not appear to be the only or primary goal of the central bank, as the monetary authorities were clearly concerned about the possible costs of a rapid disinflation. The result was clearly sub optimal: while the real effective exchange-rate appreciated by 32% between 1990 and 1993 6 , the fact that the forint was devalued 22 times, on a discretionary basis, between 1990 and February 1995, nourished the speculation against the currency and undermined the credibility of the central bank. Although the real appreciation of the exchange rate put considerable pressure on domestic inflation, the lack of confidence in 4 See Szapary and Jakab (1998) . 5 With the Bank Act of 1991 the NBH had obtained a remarkably high degree of legal independence.
In the recent ranking of central bank independence produced by Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2000) , it is ranked at the same level as the central banks of Germany and Switzerland. monetary policy failed to obtain its basic economic goals" 9 .
As overall macroeconomic conditions were becoming unsustainable (the "twin deficits"
approaching both 10% of GDP, and foreign debt increasing rapidly) the government introduced a stabilization package in March 1995. This included expenditure cuts, tax increases, a temporary import surcharge, liberalization of capital transactions, acceleration of privatizations, pension reform, and drastic wage restraints. At about the same time also exports begun to grow at a fast pace, thanks to the end of the rapid exchange-rate appreciation and to the strong growth of domestic productivity. Thus in 1996 the twin deficits were both reduced below 4% of GDP.
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And after 1997 GDP started growing at rates around or above 4.5%.
At the same time of the government adjustment programme, the exchange rate (March 13) was devalued by 9%. Immediately after (March 16), the NBH began to manage the exchange 7 "Because the sustainability of such exchange-rate policy would not have been credible, it would not have reduced inflation expectations. … As a result, whenever there was a serious deterioration in the external balance, inflation expectations were heightened" (Szapary and Jakab, 1998, p. 694-5) . See also Suranyi and Vincze (1998) . Koch (1997) As a result, the path to disinflation has been quite slow, with inflation only reaching 10% during 1999, but supported by a widespread perception of credibility, as the preannounced rate of depreciation of the currency helped to focus inflation expectations in the direction foreseen by the central bank.
14 Although this overall strategy has been questioned by supporters of a strategy based on a more rapid disinflation 15 a consensus has nevertheless emerged that -based 11 The abandonment of the previous scheme of irregular devaluations may have helped to reduce a source of conflict, on the timing and magnitude of devaluations, between the NBH and the government.
12 Szapary and Jakab (1998) stress that the success of this policy ultimately depended on its compatibility with the wage (or incomes) policy, and that the credibility of the monetary authorities was a crucial factor in achieving this result.
13 Both according to the IMF measure (CPI based) and the NBH measure (based on industrial output prices). Also notice that the NBH has generally maintained the exchange rate close to the strong part of the band.
14 In November 1998 the NBH has begun to issue a Quarterly Report in inflation, although this should not be interpreted as an adoption of an inflation targeting strategy.
15 "Monetary policy has intentionally not attempted to engineer a faster pace of disinflation, because external equilibrium improvements and real GDP growth were considered vulnerable. … Though a lower inflation rate could have been targeted and even reached by a sharper reduction of the rate of crawl -taking the fiscal policy and nominal wage increases as given -this option was ruled out … because of fears that it would lead to a real appreciation of the domestic currency … and a consumption-driven increase in domestic demand fuelled by higher real wages. The current high rate of inflation has substantial costs in terms of distorting savings and investments decision in Hungary, on the extrapolation of current policies -Hungary will converge in due time to the inflation rate of the euro area. Below we suggest a broad analytical framework, where these questions can be properly addressed.
implying substantial long-term gains to a strategy based on more rapid disinflation if … the negative short-term effects on employment and output can be contained" (OECD Economic Surveys, Hungary 1997, p.4). 16 As a consequence of the new style of exchange-rate management after March 1995, the volatility of the exchange rate around its pre-announced depreciation path has clearly diminished. But the question is whether this has had an impact on the structural equations in our macro model. 17 The following paradox should be noticed: as the exchange-rate risk premium is reduced, this implies that for any given rate of crawl the required real interest rate differential between the forint and the DM will be reduced, implying that this specific channel of monetary transmission (the real interest rate) becomes less effective in containing the rate of inflation. We shall return to this aspect later.
18 See footnote 12.
Modeling monetary policy
Our approach to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy may be described as follows.
High real interest rates induce a pressure to appreciate the exchange rate. Both directly and through the induced exchange-rate appreciation, interest rates control the evolution of aggregate demand and of the inflation rate, so that, taking into account the lag structure with which these effects take place in practice, a policy of persistent high real interest rates will lead to a process of gradual disinflation. This view of the transmission mechanism places domestic interest rates at the center of the analysis. This raises the question of how can we best describe the policy rule(s) for setting interest rates, which the monetary authorities have followed in the course of the 1990s. 20 General references on this point are e.g. Sachs (1996) , Bofinger, Flassbeck and Hoffman (1997) , Halpern and Wiplosz (1997) and Chang and Velasco (2000) . Setting targets for a limited depreciation of the nominal exchange rate may be also described as real exchange rate targeting. In the case of Hungary, such an objective has never been formally announced, although it has sometimes been described as desirable. See the discussion of this point in Siklos and Abel (2001 . On the positive side, surely projecting the evolution of money and reserve money under different scenarios helps monetary authorities in the planning of policy, but the point is that these projections are probably not relevant in a 21 Thus, as a central bank officer puts it for the case of Hungary "In the present circumstances of a changing economic environment and highly liberalized capital markets, it's hard for monetary policy to follow a monetary target. The instability of money demand, which has not yet been empirically verified by Hungarian data, is only one of the impediments. The most important problem is that the relationship of money, inflation and growth is far from predictable" (Nemenyi, 1997, p.142) . A similar observation has been made with respect to other transition economies. See for instance the discussion of the Polish case in the IMF Country Report for Poland (1998).
22 See e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) .
stylized characterization of the transmission mechanism. Overall, we do not wish to deny the importance of the monetary aggregates in the policy process, as clearly a major problem in exchange-rate targeting in transition economies is how to prevent capital inflows from inflating monetary aggregates when exchange appreciation is being used to counter inflation.
But we feel that this is in essence a problem of policy implementation and control, and it does not necessarily interfere with the transmission of policy to output and prices. Summing up, we believe that a natural choice for modeling monetary policy is to exploit the link between the path of the nominal exchange rate and the level of the interest rate differential implied by the uncovered interest parity. Hence, even if the policy announced by the authorities is defined in relation to the exchange-rate (such as, e.g., a crawling peg), we should always be able to find an interest rate rule, which is isomorphic to this policy. We examine this point more formally in the next section.
Model specification, estimation and simulation
Our modeling strategy follows to a large extent that suggested by Svensson (2000) for a small open economy. The model includes four dynamic behavioral equations: for aggregate supply (normalized in the rate of inflation), aggregate demand (output gap), the exchange rate (uncovered interest parity) and the domestic interest rate. External shocks originate for foreign prices, foreign demand and foreign interest rates. In addition, we also model the evolution of the risk premium required by risk-averse participants to the exchange-rate market. In the first sub-section we present our data set and examine the stationarity properties of the variables under study. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 we discuss the structural model and its steady state solution. In section 3.4 we evaluate the results of the estimation strategy, and in sections 3.5 and 3.6 we present the results of within-and out-of-sample simulations respectively.
The data
The model as outlined above involves seven variables. Domestic prices, p , are measured by the CPI; the output gap, y , by the demeaned capacity utilization ratio; the nominal exchangerate, e , by the average exchange of the Hungarian forint with the DM and the USD; foreign prices, p* , are the average of the Germany and US CPI; the domestic interest rate, i , is taken to be the three month Treasury Bills rate; world demand, w , is proxied by the index of world trade in manufactures; the foreign interest rate, i* , by the average short term German (call money) and US (3 months certificates of deposit) interest rates. We have collected a quarterly sample from 1989 to 1999
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. For estimation we have used the same sample, 1991.1-1999.4, for all variables and lag structures. All variables except interest rates are measured in logs.
The stationarity properties of all the relevant variables are summarized in Table 1 , where the Dickey and Fuller (1979) statistics are reported in column ADF. The corresponding order of augmentation is reported in column k
24
. Additional deterministic variables (column model) are selected on the basis of their statistical significance. In the Table we report for each variable the statistics for level test and, if the unit root null is not rejected, also for the first difference test. Although the short time span suggests that the results should be interpreted with care, it seems reasonable to conclude that the nominal exchange-rate, the domestic and foreign price levels, and the world trade are all integrated of the first order. On the other hand, domestic and 23 See the Data Appendix for the sources and definitions of the data. 24 The order k is selected from a top-down t-test approach, starting from a maximum lag of five (four for the variables in first differences). If the last included lag is not 10% significant (from the standard normal distribution) k is reduced by one until the last lag is significant (see Campbell and Perron, 1991) .
foreign inflation, domestic and foreign interest rates, and the capacity utilization ratio are all stationary. -4.2324, -3.5386, and -3.2009 , for the model with constant and trend (c, t).
Tab. 1 -Unit root tests, 1991 -1999
( c ) * and ** respectively indicate 5% and 1% significant tests.
Finally, the statistic in the last row of Table 1 suggests that (e, p*, p) are cointegrated, i.e.
that the real exchange-rate level is stationary around a constant term that measures the long run estimated PPP.
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Looking at the AR order of the retained univariate models (column k), a number of features emerge. (i) As expected, the high AR order of w and y reflects their complex cyclical behavior.
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(ii) The stationarity of ∆p* is robust to the presence of a deterministic trend; in fact an alternative AR(1) mean reverting model is also data admissible (ADF statistics: -4.164).
(iii) Both domestic and foreign nominal interest rates are stationary, with an AR dynamics of high order. (iv) Finally, the lag order coherence between the level and the corresponding firstdifference models is remarkable.
The structural model
The model includes four structural equations. We list each equation with the actual lag structure used in the estimation. Lags have been selected by imposing data admissible restrictions to a more general dynamic model (results are not reported).
In the aggregate supply equation, domestic inflation is driven by the long run PPP (cointegrated) condition and, in the short run, is affected by the rate of capacity utilization 27 :
25 Given the economic relevance of this result, we also tested for PPP cointegration by following Johansen (1995) approach. Results obtained from alternative data congruent VAR models for e, p* and p (with restricted intercept, and with or without trend) confirm the findings from the ADF test.
Details are available upon request. Kocenda (1999) also reports a similar result.
26 Also note that the model for y does not include an intercept as the data have been demeaned. 27 See Hamecz, I., J. Vincze and I. Zsoldos (1996) for a thorough but non-conclusive discussion on modeling inflation in Hungary.
where ∆ and ∆ 4 indicate the first difference at lags 1 and 4 respectively. The value 4.635 is the long run PPP (estimated from the cointegration relationship), and ε 1t is a supply shock.
In the aggregate demand equation, the capacity utilization ratio is linked to lags of the real interest rate, to the change in the real exchange rate and to the growth of world demand:
where E t-1 ∆ 4 p t measures the expectation formed in quarter t-1 of the inflation rate, defined as p t -p t-4 , and ε 2 t is a demand shock.
The nominal exchange-rate equation is based on the UIP hypothesis, augmented with a stationary AR(1) zero mean risk premium, ϕ t :
e t = E t e t+1 − (i t − i * t )/4 + ϕ t , were:
and ε 3 t is a shock to the risk premium.
Finally, the nominal interest rate differential is given by a dynamic open-economy Taylor rule:
where the central bank is assumed to set the nominal rate differential on the basis of the rational expectation of the future inflation differential, and on the expected capacity utilization. Notice that this structural equation retains the same high AR orders which we had identified for both i and i* in the univariate analysis.
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As we had observed in Table 1 , all the variables in equations (1)- (4) 31
Fig. 1 -Long run forecast of the foreign variables
28 Goodfriend (1987) and Walsh (1998, ch.10 ) rationalize the inclusion of autoregressive parameters in interest rate rules with a reference to the authorities desire to smooth the path of interest rates. 29 It is important to notice that it has not been necessary to introduce any dummy variables in the estimated equations. 30 These are computed as the long run (annualized) solutions to their respective mean-reverting univariate representations discussed in Table 1 . 31 Notice however that in the simulations (to be discussed below) we have always run the model until 2020. As regards the steady state solution for the domestic variables, first observe from equation (4) that the domestic nominal interest rate equals the foreign rate when the expected inflation differential is null and the expected capacity utilization is at its normalized value (zero). In this case, then also the nominal exchange rate in equation (3) is expected to remain constant since, in the absence of shocks ε 4 , the risk premium converges to zero. Equation (1) confirms that the inflation differential will vanish when the domestic price level reaches its PPP value.
Finally, this is consistent with the steady state value of the rate of capacity utilization (y = 0) if the following parameter restriction holds in equation (2):
Putting things together, the steady state solution for the domestic variables is characterized by: While (under the hypothesis of a correctly specified model) system estimators asymptotically dominate the limited information ones, given the small size of the sample we also want to check for the robustness of the results to the choice of estimator. In Table 2 we report a number of alternative estimates under the instrumental variable strategy.
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32 A final question also relates to the choice of the specific instruments, i.e. whether to use all instruments in all equations, or different ones for each equation. 33 The use of a model based strategy for the expectational variables delivers similar results (available upon request). 34 We report for simplicity only the estimation results (non-significant estimates are in italic) although a number of diagnostic tests were performed. All estimations were made with Eviews 4.0, and are reproducible by downloading the databank at: http://www.spbo.unibo.it/pais/golinelli/macro.html . (1) As we can see from Table 2 , parameter estimates are fairly robust to the choice of alternative estimators. All the coefficients, which we expected to be non-zero, are always significant 35 and correctly signed. In particular, these results suggest the following empirical insights:
Tab. 2 -Alternative estimates of equations
In the supply equation (1), ceteris paribus inflation absorbs about 10% of the previous quarter disequilibrium with respect to the long run PPP (α 14 ); in the short run, also demand shocks (α 13 ) are quite relevant. In general, however, inflation is highly persistent (with a first order coefficient, α 11 , equal to about 0.8).
Demand shocks in equation (2) also have a high persistence, as the sum of the autoregressive parameters, α 24 and α 25 , is about 0.8; in the short run, relevant effects come from the lagged domestic real interest rates (α 22 ) and from the foreign sector (competitiveness, α 23 , and world demand, α 26 ).
In equation (3), the risk premium slowly reverts to zero after a shock: the estimate of the autoregressive α 31 parameter (in the 0.75-0.90 range) suggests that between one fourth and one half of a shock to the risk premium is still lingering on after five quarters.
The estimates of equation (4) . 36 The fact that interest rates do not respond to aggregate demand (or capacity utilization) in the short run does not imply that the real costs of the stabilization policy are disregarded. In our model, the monetary authorities choose the desired degree of restraint by setting a path for the nominal exchange rate path, which implies a moderate appreciation of the real rate. The fact that α 46 = 0 implies only that this policy is unchanged across the business cycle.
inflation on interest rates is greater than one. Notice that this is a necessary condition for a non-accommodative anti-inflationary policy.
Tab. 3 -3SLS estimation of equations (1) . However we need to check for the validity of the assumptions on the normality of the residuals and the 37 The alternative GMM estimator brings efficiency gains in presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation but it is asymptotically the same as 3SLS if the disturbances are white noise. In absence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, in order to enjoy the favorable (asymptotic)
properties of the estimator. Table 3 presents the 3SLS estimates, after having set to zero the previously (in Table 2 ) non-significant parameters. In the last two columns we report upper and lower bounds of a rather narrow (90%) confidence interval. Note that almost all estimates in Table 2 are bounded by the confidence interval of the estimates in Table 3 .
Diagnostic statistics on estimated residuals are reported in Table 4 . Overall, we reject normality only for the residuals of equation (4). However, this is due to two outliers (1992.3; 1993.3) . As the estimates of the structural parameters would be substantially unaltered if we introduced two dummy variables to take care of these outliers, we chose not to introduce any dummies. In general, the estimated model explains quite well the historical pattern of the dependent variables, as it is clear in particular from the plots of actual and fitted values (Figure 2 ).
Stability analysis
In the context of our model, it is important to evaluate the stability of the estimated equations.
This is clearly a difficult task, since the short data span forbids an in-depth analysis. The issue is further complicated, statistically, by the fact that several variables exhibit a higher volatility in the first part of the sample. In such case, it is possible that some diagnostic tests will fail to detect heteroskedaticity, and Chow tests can suffer from a lack of efficiency.
Nevertheless, the need to assess stability is crucial, especially in view of the fact that, as we acknowledged in section 2, the conduct of monetary policy, and hence the style of exchangeaddition, if disturbances are also normally distributed, 3SLS has the same asymptotic distribution as the (asymptotically efficient) full information maximum likelihood estimator. Finally, GMM methods are more data demanding than 3SLS: in particular, in Table 2 we do not report the GMM estimates for the case of general instruments because they are infeasible, given the number of observations. Since we feel that the use of general instruments is less arbitrary in comparison to the use of specific instruments for each equation, this motivates our choice for the 3SLS estimator.
rate management, has clearly changed after March 1995. This change followed immediately after the adoption of a fiscal policy stabilization package and a large devaluation of the exchange rate. Thus a natural question to ask is: how is it possible to fit a single monetary policy rule, such as that in equation (4), spanning both sub-samples, before and after March 1995? To address this question, we conduct a number of stability and specification tests.
Results are shown in the lower part of Table 4 and in Table 5 .
In the last four rows of Table 4 we report the results of some Chow tests for predictive failure. 
Tab. 4 -Diagnostic tests, 3SLS estimation, 1991-1999 period
equation (1) equation (2) equation (3) equation (4) S. 0.195 (1991), 0.062 (1991-1992), 0.988 (1998-1999) , and 0.362 (1999).
Next, we conducted a number of stability analyses on the coefficients of the whole system, and of equation (4) We analyze these results in more detail in Table 5 . In columns (1) and (2) we reproduce, for ease of comparison, the 3SLS unrestricted (last column of Table 2 ) and restricted (first columns of Table 3) estimates. In columns (3) and (4) we report the detailed estimation results when we allow some crucial parameters to vary between the two sub-samples. Given the high number of parameters to be estimated when breaking up the model, the resulting point estimates are bound to be imprecise and not always significant. To interpret the results, note that the α' ij parameters are multiplied by dummy variables set equal to 0 in the second sub-sample (after 1995.1). In the estimation, all these added α' ij parameters are nonsignificantly different from zero, both in column (3) and (4).
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It is especially interesting to observe the results in column (4). In this case, the crucial parameters of the exchange-rate and of the interest rate equations are clearly stable across the two sub-samples, and while the three first-period dummies are all non-significant, they do not change appreciably the value or the significance of the parameters estimated across the full sample.
A last test on the specification of the model is the following. It may be argued that the introduction of a complex dynamic structure (such as the one in eq. (4)) can obscure the presence of a structural break. For instance, it has been suggested by Hall, Mizon and Welfe (2000, p. 352 ) that long lags may appear significant not because they naturally belong in the dynamic structure of an equation, but because their presence captures the shift due to a change in regime. To allow for this possibility, we split the whole model in two sub-samples 38 The chi-square statistics are respectively 3.598 (p-value 0.825) and 2.711 (0.438).
(although we need to leave some overlap between the two, to save enough degrees of freedom for estimation). We report the estimates for the two samples in columns 5 and 6 respectively.
In general, the two sets of estimates are quite comparable to each other (and to the full sample estimates reported in column 3). Although several coefficients have a lower absolute value in the second sub-sample (probably due to the reduced variability of most variables) most of them retain the same sign and significance.
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Exceptions to this conclusion are few and confined to the coefficients of the first two equations. For the interest rate equation (eq.4) there is evidence of a smoother dynamic behavior in the second part of the sample, but the equation retains its broad characteristics across the two periods. In particular, the long run elasticity of the interest rate to the inflation differential is virtually identical (just above unity) in the two periods 40 .
To conclude our analysis of parameter stability, although the precision of our estimates will improve as new data become available 41 , for the time being we are satisfied that the estimates presented in Table 3 Quarterly inflation rate equation (1) Demeaned capacity utilisation equation (2) Nominal exchange rate equation (3) Nominal interest rate equation (4) 
Out of sample simulations
To examine the long run implications of our model, we have simulated it outside the sample of estimation. Any solution to the model must take into account the forward-looking nature of the exchange rate in equation (3). This requires the choice of an appropriate terminal condition. We have assumed that the real exchange rate converges to the long run PPP at the end of the solution period. This allows us to find a consistent expectations solution to the model. In addition, the convergence of the iterative procedure is ensured by the existence of a steady state solution for the inflation rate, capacity utilization and domestic interest rates. In particular, we want to project the time-path for 42 We performed the simulations with a Fair and Taylor (1983) scheme, without the automatic extension of the time horizon, using Eviews 4. 43 The simulation results are unaffected when moving the end point of the simulation backward (until 2015) or forward.
disinflation, which is implied by the estimated policy rule, conditioning on the assumed scenario for the foreign variables (see Section 3.3 and Figure 1 ). In Figure 3 , we show the deterministic solution for the four endogenous and two foreign variables of the model. As the graphs show, inflation, the nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate are forecast to converge to the respective foreign or stationary levels around 2006-08. 44 Thanks to the favorable evolution of the foreign variables, the demeaned rate of capacity utilization is persistently positive, thus implying a utilization level around 83% of potential output.
3.5.2
To obtain a more realistic picture, we also performed a stochastic simulation of the model (2000 repetitions). The unknown equation errors were measured by pseudo-random values, extracted from a distribution with a covariance matrix estimated from the historical 44 The long run stationary level of the real exchange rate is equal to 4.635, given by the PPP log-level, see equation (1). 1996-1999 data.
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The simulated path of domestic inflation (mean and 90% confidence interval) for the period 2000-2020 is plotted in Figure 4 . While this simulation adds uncertainty on the length of the actual path to disinflation, it does not alter its qualitative characteristics, and provides indirect confirmation that the estimated policy stance, if maintained, would bring to the full convergence of the inflation rate to that of the euro area. For this reason, we preferred to estimate the standard errors from a more restricted sub-sample, thus avoiding the high noise of the 1995 data. 46 In order to reduce the burden of simulating a model with consistent expectations, we set the lead on the exchange rate equal to the deterministic solution augmented with the residuals from eq. (3).
Within-sample simulations
A more sophisticated set of questions relates to the policy stance adopted by the NBH. Would it have been feasible to disinflate at a faster rate? Which output costs would have been caused by a more aggressive policy? Clearly an econometric model is not fully appropriate to answer these questions, as it is hard to address in this context the issues raised by the Lucas (1976) critique. For instance, had a more aggressive disinflation policy convincingly been announced at any point in time, this might have generated an entirely different time path of risk premia, which would have implied a different dynamic response of the exchange rate to the interest rate stance adopted by the central bank. While these are questions of the greatest practical importance, unfortunately we can address them, on the basis of the estimated model, only at the margin, i.e. assuming that everything else -other than the "aggressiveness" of the central bank -would have been the same. Economic intuition suggests that probably this leads us to over-estimate the costs of a more aggressive policy, as we do not build into the simulation the additional gains from increased credibility; however, we cannot prove this point.
In Overall, this simulation points to the fact that a faster disinflation would have been feasible, but costly in terms of foregone output. We must however stress that these results must be interpreted with caution, as it is quite possible that some of the estimated parameters are not deep in the specific sense of being chosen independently from the policy rule, which the monetary authority is expected to follow. For instance, it is possible that, conditional on the NBH credibly announcing a more resolute disinflation path, the degree of persistence of both inflation (the autoregressive parameter α 11 ) and the exchange-rate risk premium (α 31 ) might 48 Figure 5 reports the differences between the simulated baseline policy and the simulated aggressive policy. In turn, the baseline simulation uses the estimated parameters reported in Table 3 , but the time path described for the endogenous variables is marginally different from the historical path, as the 33 have been lower. These changes could have an ambiguous effect on the speed of disinflation.
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Thus the simulations summarized in Figure 4 may have a heuristic value only to the extent that the assumed change in the parameter α 45 does not affect the other parameters reported in Table 3 . More generally, if the output costs of disinflation are negatively related to the credibility of the central bank, and the latter increases (at least, up to a point) with the degree of policy aggressiveness, then we may believe that the results of this simulation indicate an upper bound for the output loss resulting from a faster disinflation.
baseline simulations are obtained imposing the constraint on the terminal value of the exchange-rate described in the text. 
Discussion and policy implications
We turn now to some considerations on the economic significance and policy implications of the results presented in the previous section.
The specification of our model is very much in the spirit of the theoretical model proposed by Svensson (2000) for a small open economy. It is also quite similar (apart from the obvious inclusion, in the equations for aggregate demand and supply, of a term in the exchange rate) to the analogous model of a closed economy.
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Thus it is natural to attempt to summarize the implications of our findings in terms of what we have learned about the monetary transmission mechanism, the policy strategy and the choice of the exchange-rate regime for an economy in transition. We articulate this discussion in seven points.
First, it has been often asserted that an essential characteristic of monetary stabilization in transition countries is that it operates essentially through the induced appreciation of the real exchange rate (Halpern and Wiplosz, 1997) . However, as it has also been observed, " [after 1995 ] the Hungarian approach has been successful in lowering the scope of real appreciation and in diminishing the volatility of real exchange rates, although at the cost of higher inflation" (Orlowski, 2000) . In this respect, we have found that monetary policy operates simultaneously through different channels: the aggregate demand and rational expectations channels, which are directly activated by changes in the real rate of interest, and the exchangerate channel, which in turn operates both through the competitiveness effect on aggregate demand and through the induced changes in the cost of imports.
Second, we have found that -although each channel of transmission operates with its own lag structure -they are all simultaneously activated by the same policy action, that is, a change in the nominal rate of interest. In particular the structure and results of our model confirm that the exchange-rate policy and the interest rate setting decisions of a central bank are two sides of the same coin: where the desired level or path of the exchange-rate is the intermediate 50 For instance, in the closed economy model of Svensson (1997) , domestic real interest rates enter directly (with a lag) into the determination of aggregate demand, which then affects inflation. These effects remain unaltered in the open economy model, where the intertemporal equilibrium conditions for the exchange-rate market contribute to reinforce the transmission of monetary impulses. In particular it has been generally acknowledged (see e.g. Orlowski, 2000. p. 158 ) that "the exchangerate channel of monetary transmission has a shorter impact lag than do the rational expectations and aggregate demand channels".
target, and the level of the domestic rate is the corresponding instrument
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. Target and instrument are linked with each other by the conditions for intertemporal equilibrium in the exchange-rate market. There are two additional, hard-to-control ingredients in this equilibrium relationship: one is the required risk premium (which we have modeled as a random variable with a strong autoregressive component) and the other is the rational expectation of future monetary policy. The latter is an essential ingredient in the transmission of current policy impulses through the exchange rate. In fact, an increase in the current interest rate appreciates the current exchange rate for any given expectation of the forward rate (relative to the expected path of foreign interest rates). In its turn, the forward rate depends on the future expected interest rate, and ultimately on the whole expected sequence of future interest rate differentials. In any case, this is perhaps the main addition to the previous debate on monetary policy in transition that we seek to contribute: that any chosen exchange-rate policy always takes the form of a supporting sequence of interest rate decisions.
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Third, we may also note that, if we substitute the interest rate rule, equation (4), solved for the long run, into the exchange-rate equilibrium condition, equation (3), we obtain: 51 In the previous transition literature, some authors prefer to think of these two policy channels as alternatives. For instance Orlowski (2000) writes, in reference to Hungary, that: "the exchange-rate bias in monetary policy is likely to neutralize the aggregate demand and the rational expectations channels of monetary transmission. These two channels are activated by the alternative policy regimes". The view put forward in this paper is instead that these two channels should be seen as complementing each other and working in the same direction (although possibly through different lag structures). 52 Moreover, we have shown that it is feasible to implement empirically the rational expectations forward-looking approach to the determination of the exchange rate via the uncovered (risk- Equation (5) is quite similar to the way in which the crawling peg policy is announced by the NBH. But it is important to notice that there is no contradiction between equation (5) ) operates by raising the sequence of current and expected future interest rates, and thus also inducing an appreciation of the current exchange-rate, which is consistent with a subsequent faster path of depreciation. Finally on this point, notice that, while equation (5) corresponds to the policy adopted by the NBH in March 1995, it cannot continue for long in the future: as domestic inflation will converge more closely towards the foreign level (and hence the rate of crawl will become progressively slower 54 ) monetary policy would need to be reformulated either in terms of an explicit and more "traditional" interest rate rule (i.e. focusing on an inflation target) or by choosing a fixed 53 Our best point estimate for γ (long run) is 1.07. See the last row of Table 3. A corresponding estimate for Germany is close to 1.30 , see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) . 54 As we recalled in section 2, the monthly rate of crawl was finally set to 0.3% in April 2000. Sixth, it may seem prima facie surprising that we have found that interest rates also operate effectively through the aggregate demand channel in countries with a more rudimentary financial system and with a more backward productive system, relative to the industrialized countries. However two arguments may overcome this objection. (a) It is possible that, in transition countries, an increase in real interest rates activates the credit channel of policy transmission (in particular by reducing credit availability at domestic banks), to a larger extent than it does in the more industrialized countries.
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(b) There may be important non-linear effects of monetary policy, such that at high levels of the real interest rate and of the inflation rate, the dampening effect of the former on the latter may be larger in absolute value.
Seventh, our analysis has confirmed the existence of a clear trade-off between the speed of disinflation and the level of aggregate demand. Disinflation at a faster path (keeping it between 8% to 10% below the historical values) would have implied (without taking into account the credibility gains from a more aggressive antiinflationary stance) a lower output growth of about 2% for about five years. On these points, our results have also confirmed that the NBH has purposely chosen, after 1995, a quite slow but steady path to disinflation, which has been consistent with a rather sustained path of capacity utilization.
Conclusions
In this paper we have modeled the relation between monetary policy and disinflation in Hungary using a small structural rational expectations model of an open economy. By setting the level of domestic interest rates, the NBH activates different channels of monetary policy. 56 In particular it has often been observed that a credit crunch is more likely to take place during phases of extremely high real interest rates, and there is no doubt that such phases have been occurring more often in Hungary (and in other transition countries, such as Poland) than in the more advanced industrial countries.
Interest rates directly affect aggregate demand (the output gap) and the exchange rate (through a forward looking uncovered interest parity relationship). In turn, a change in the current real exchange-rate influences both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. All these different channels work together and in the same direction, although with different strength and lag structures, ultimately determining the path of inflation.
In this setup, although monetary policy is neutral in the long run, it has real short run effects, which provides the impulses required to control inflation. Of course this implies that, when policy-makers inherit a high inflation state, then disinflation will be costly, so that monetary authorities are justified when they want to take these costs into account. We have attempted to estimate these costs by simulating alternative feasible paths for disinflation (within and outside the sample of estimation). One of our findings is that the current speed of disinflation could be accelerated (relative to the path already implicit in current policy settings) only with a non-negligible additional output cost.
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As regards the policy decision rules, we have also shown that our modeling strategy -which is to define monetary policy by means of an interest rate rule -is consistent with the exchangerate policy that has been adopted by the NBH in the latter part of the decade. The focus of the monetary policy of the NBH since 1991 has always been the exchange-rate, first through a series of ad hoc devaluations then -after March 1995 -with a crawling peg with preannounced, progressively reduced, daily devaluations. In this setup, the exchange-rate is best seen as an intermediate target, with the final goal being the foreign (euro) inflation level, and the crucial policy decision being the rate of (dis-)inflation, i.e. the rate of convergence 57 This statement is conditional on whether the estimated parameters would remain stable outside the sample of estimation. Since these estimates refer to a period that is literally a "transition", we must be very cautious when making projections beyond 1999. This is true in general, but in particular for those variables, which determine the effectiveness of the policy decisions. 41 towards foreign inflation; the level of the short-term interest rate is the corresponding instrument. Once the inflation goal is about to be reached, so that the path of preannounced devaluation becomes slow enough, it will then become natural to "shift gears" and either move on to a fixed exchange-rate regime or to inflation targeting. The results presented in this paper do not suggest any specific comment on this last choice, although clearly its time is almost ripe
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58 Siklos and Abel (2001) discuss at length whether it would be appropriate for the NBH to adopt, at the time of their writing, an inflation targeting approach. They conclude that such a strategy would be viable, but that certain aspects of a more institutional nature (such as the relations between the NBH and the government and between the government and the European Union) would need to be clarified first. Nominal effective exchange rate (log-fourth differences) 91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99 
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